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Look What They've Done To My Brain Ma!: Ethical
Issues in Brain and Behavior Control
Kenneth Vaux*
Control and modification of the human brain and of human be-
havior are powers fraught with ethical significance because they
simultaneously hold great promise and great danger. They are bor-
derline problems for the mind and spirit to ponder. The question
this paper considers, psychosurgery and behavioral chemotherapy
in proxy consent populations, mainly children and prisoners, will by
definition be a borderline question. The phrase, "borderline ques-
tion," in the nomenclature of ethics has no diagnostic meaning. A
borderline case appears at the boundaries of accepted scientific and
moral insights. In ethics, a borderline case clarifies basic ethical
principles because the uncertainty and novelty which inhere in the
new situation force clarity at the fundamental level. In the area of
brain and behavior control, we are dealing with a scientific frontier.
Our knowledge base is still in its infancy. We are dealing with proxy
consent which challenges the fundamental principle of informed
consent. With the brain we are dealing with the higher reaches of
human function. We also probe the periphery of that transcending
sphere poets and artists have called the human mind, personality,
soul, spirit.
Surgical and chemical treatment of the brain holds the promise
of alleviating much human misery and releasing presently dormant
capacities in man's mind. It is expected that correction and therapy
will become available for problems such as memory loss, mental
retardation, blindness, debilitating emotional illness, the incapaci-
tation resulting from strokes and seizures, and a wide range of neu-
rological handicaps. Enhancing the powers of the human mind from
the perinatal period where brain growth and health is so critical to
the period when aging and senility diminish the brain's powers is
also promised.
The future is also foreboding and full of threat. The arts, includ-
ing films and novels such as, Clockwork Orange,I The Ruling Class,2
* Professor of Ethics, Baylor College of Medicine; Director of the Institute of Religion and
Human Development.
1. A. BURGESS, CLOCKWORK ORANGE (1963).
2. P. BARNES, THE RULING CLASS (1969).
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and Darkness at Noon,3 record like a radar screen our society's pre-
monitions. There is no doubt that the diminution of freedom
through both invasive controls, ESB, surgery, drugs and extrinsic
media education, as well as the danger of blunting and destroying
personality, are powers carried in these developments.
Key themes in this topic, in other words, can be traced to the
Latin verb violare. We are concerned with violence. When a per-
son's behavior becomes so explosive and disruptive that it incapac-
itates or injures self and perhaps harms the fellowman, we look
to measures, social or therapeutic, which will contain or ameliorate
the distortion, bringing behavior back into the bounds of the accept-
able. We also speak of the human mind as a sacred trust that is
inviolable; that is, we will not permit it to be willfully violated.
In this paper I will begin with the assumption that the purpose
of man is creating value in his history, taking an awesome and
protective stance before the being of his fellow man. The borderline
experience of proxy consent for brain and behavior control, I will
contend, yields two important consequences of this assumption.
The practical consequence is that an ethic and derivative legal pol-
icy should be encouraged which will allow experimental brain and
behavior research and therapy within certain limits where consent
is by proxy. I would argue in contrast with Mr. Kaimowitz that an
ethical approach demands human investigations. In the spirit of his
approach I would insist that this always be strictly reviewed and
monitored. The theoretical position I will derive from this argument
is that a transcendent estimate of man's value will best guide us into
the future carried in these developments.
The sham of human review committees, like the one in the Detroit
case4 where an ill-informed C.P.A. finally rendered the decision,
must end. I agree with Leon Kass that all research protocols should
pay knowledgeable ombudsmen and advocates of the subject's
interest. Kass has urged that all publicly sponsored biomedial
research should have a 1% budget allocation to insure human
protection.'
First, a few words about my underlying assumption. If man's
3. A. KOESTLER, DARKNESS AT NOON (1949).
4. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, Civil No. 73-19,434-AW (Cir. Ct. Wayne
Co., Mich., July 10, 1973).
5. Conversations with Leon Kass, Kennedy Institute Center for Bioethics of Georgetown
University, at periodic gatherings at the Hastings Institute, Hastings-on-Hudson, N.Y.
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destiny on the earth is to generate value and honor the mystery of
being in his fellows, he should be imaginative and creative within
the bounds of caution. Max Lerner has said whimsically that
[I]n England, everything that's not especially forbidden is
permitted; in Germany, everything that's not especially per-
mitted is forbidden; in France, everything is permitted, even
including that which is forbidden; and in Russia everything is
forbidden, including that which is is permitted.'
Surely the genius of our American civilization is that we coura-
geously explore frontiers, maintaining all the while the precautions
we inherited from our European heritage. We possess what Lerner
elsewhere calls "a metaphysic of promise." 7 We are willing to take
chances and to allow others to test the unknown and the experimen-
tal. In this approach, value can be not only conserved but enriched
and built up. Our spiritual heritage gives us a spirit of imagination
and courage, not one of timidity and caution.
Before I develop the main practical and theoretical argument, let
us examine three cases which will illustrate the personal and public
dimensions of the problem. I draw the cases from the material we
are considering in this symposium.
I. Dr. 0. J. Andy has operated on children, some who are insti-
tutionalized, whose behavior has broken the bounds of acceptabil-
ity, expressing itself in "erratic aggression," "hyperactivity," and
"emotional instability." These children, we may assume, have vio-
lated or penetrated the boundaries of what we can endure-perhaps
what their own bodies can endure. He has treated one nine year old
epileptic boy from Mississippi, for example, by surgically invading
first the thalmus, then the fornix, intervening in these brain struc-
tures related to emotion, to correct "hyperactive, combative, explo-
sive, destructive, sadistic behavior.'' s
II. In February, 1954, the parents of 17-year old John Doe asked
the court to commit their son to the Kalamazoo State Hospital.
Shortly thereafter, the young man admitted luring a student nurse
to the hospital basement, first strangling her with a necktie, then
allegedly violating her dead body. Under Michigan law he was con-
victed as a criminal sexual psychopath and committed to the Ionia
6. Lerner, Images of America and Man, 3 GRADUATE J. 22 (1960).
7. Id. at 32.
8. M. PINES, THE BRAIN CHANGERS: SCIENTISTS AND THE NEw MIND CONTROL 227 (1974).
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Detention Center "until such time as he is proven not to be a danger
to society."'
After being institutionalized 18 years, John Doe was offered the
opportunity to undergo brain surgery to alleviate his violent impul-
ses. The now famous case of Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental
Health0 ensued which finally revoked the law under which the boy
was convicted and precipitated the suspension of the medical proto-
col under which the operation would have taken place.
III. The third illustration is the somewhat tongue-in-cheek pro-
posal of Kenneth Clark, President of the American Psychological
Association. He suggested at a recent meeting of the Association"
that some form of medication which would soften aggression be
given to effect "internal disarmament" in the leaders of the world,
to prompt them to preserve peace. Such peace pills, dispensed to
political leaders, would supposedly diminish barbarian instincts
and foster geopolitical contentment. 2
One immediately envisions a Delgadian image of the world as a
great Tijuana Arena with the world heads of state as the charging
bulls: Churchill, still beset with his childhood minimal brain dys-
function untempered by ritilin; Gerald Ford, as LBJ envisioned
him, playing football too often without a helmet; King Faisil, before
his deranged philosopher nephew did him in. Dr. Delgado holds the
radio transmitter, controlling the dyalitrodes, releasing chemical or
electrical modifiers into the heads of these raging, snorting,
stampeding creatures-what an image! 3
These provocative cases, all concerned with proxy individuals,
i.e., those who are once removed and who we are either responsible
for or responsible to, throw us back to a very basic practical decision
we now must make as a society. This practical question in turn
forces us to take a stand on an even more fundamental value of the
nature of human life. Let me first explore the practical decision.
The Department of Health, Education and Welfare has estab-
9. Detroit Free Press, Jan. 7, 1973, at 4-A. Mr. Kaimowitz has subsequently suggested
that these news quotes were later repudiated. Question has also been raised as to whether
the corpse was raped. To the time of this writing clarity on these points is still lacking.
10. Civil No. 73-19,434-AW (Cir. Ct., Wayne Co., Mich., July 10, 1973).
11. Rensberger, Can a Pill be Mightier Than the Sword?, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1971, at
9, col. 1.
12. Id.
13. J. DELGADO, PHYSICAL CONTROL OF THE MIND: TOWARD A PSYCHOCIVILIZED SOCIETY
(1969).
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lished a National Commission on Biomedical and Behavioral Re-
search which is presently examining the question of fetal research
and will soon turn its attention to the question of brain and behavior
modification. A moratorium similar to the one now in effect in the
fetal area may soon be imposed in the mental area. The pervasive
mood in our society following the Edelin case," and the Tuskegee
syphilis experience," etc., is one of caution, evaluation, and reflec-
tion. Out of this time of reevaluation we may hope an imaginative
spirit will emerge that will lift us out of the present malaise of
cynicism and caution. We would hope also that this new mood
would reclaim the legal profession to the roles of advocacy and pro-
tection and away from the present concerns to encourage opportun-
ism and exploitation. Part of the new creativity should be a renewed
commitment to creativity in experimental research and treatment.
This must always be tempered by an awesome respect for man and
his dignity, thus yielding a commitment to justice, freedom and
truthfulness.
At this point I would like to address the issue of the right of a
person to submit her body to certain experimental procedures which
may benefit herself and mankind. I want to argue that we should
retain this privilege even for proxy consent populations (prisoners
and children). I believe we should look much more seriously at the
capacities for freely-elected informed determinations even in these
groups.
We are dealing here with one of the fundamental opportunities for
altruism, one approaching the image of self-sacrifice that the New
Testament calls the "greater love": "Greater love has no man than
this that he lay down his life for his friends."'" This virtue is rooted
at the crux of our civilization. The exercise of this value should not
be categorically denied any person, even those over whom we are
custodians. The opportunity to perform the benevolent action, I
would contend, is basic to man's freedom.
Robert Burt and Francis Allen, appointed as counsel to John Doe
at the Kaimowitz trial argued that a prisoner with a supposed
organic or psychopathic disturbance does not have the right, or in
14. Commonwealth v. Edelin, Civil No. 81,823 (Super. Ct. Suffolk Co., Mass., 1975).
15. HEW, FINAL REPORT OF THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY AD Hoc ADVISORY PANEL (1973).
16. John 15:13.
17. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, Civil No. 73-19,434-AW (Cir. Ct. Wayne
Co., Mich., July 10, 1973).
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their language, the competence, to submit himself to psychosurgery.
Their argument was based somewhat on Will Gaylin's point that the
diseased organ in this case becomes the organ of consent."8 It is
interesting that they also argued at the same time that the law
under which he was convicted should be rescinded and he should
be released back into the society. The correct decision was probably
rendered in this case, especially in the light of John Doe's subse-
quent ambivalence as to whether he wanted the surgery or not. For
all we know about brain structure and function, it may be that 18
years in the cooler has the same effect as an amygdalotomy, just
as ten years of public school has a depressing effect similar to ritilin
on hyperactivity, hypersensitivity, perhaps even creativity.
The point is intriguing because it raises the moral issue of
whether the public should prevent individuals from making self-
determinations that may be for their own good or for the subsequent
good of others.
A recent hearing in Kentucky weighed the question of whether a
mentally retarded sibling could donate a kidney to his brother. 9 My
persuasion on this issue is similar to my position on research on the
aborted fetus. Why not allow some redeeming value to ensue from
such unfortunate situations? John Erlichmann has recently pleaded
that he be allowed to follow Hasidic tradition (I didn't know he was
Jewish) in redeeming a bad deed with a good deed, by allowing him
to serve his sentence doing volunteer work among the Pueblo Indi-
ans, rather than sitting in Lancaster Federal Prison writing his
memoirs. 0 This may make some sense if our goals are both restric-
tion and rehabilitation, punishment and purification. Dostoevsky
and later Solzhenitsyn personally knew the death and salvation that
crime and punishment afforded Raskolnikov .2
It can be argued that we should not forbid prisoners, children, or
politicians for that matter, the opportunity to present themselves as
experimental subjects. One senses two arguments from those who
seek to protect the prisoner from the dangers of medical trials. The
first argument is valid. These people should not be coerced, enticed,
18. Gaylin, The Law and the Biological Revolution, 10 COLUM. J. LAW & Soc. PROB. 46,
76 (1973).
19. Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969).
20. N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1975, at PE-15.
21. The main character of Crime and Punishment. F. DOSTOEVSKY, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
(1968).
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or selectively rewarded by their willingness to become guinea pigs.
The second argument is less convincing. Prisoners are there for pun-
ishment. They should not be allowed the conscience-soothing option
of testing new treatments for the benefit of their fellow-man.
I would argue that the vindictive spirit should not be so extreme
as to limit any redeeming act by one for whom the act would be
exonerating and spiritually restoring. The desire for reform, regener-
ation, and redirection of life should prompt us not to remove from
the criminal the option of benevolent, repenting action. We should
hold open the opportunity for life to be redeemed from the pit.
The Kaimowitz case, of course, is different. Here the surgery is
supposedly for John Doe's own good. It will diminish his violent
passions and make him more socially safe and acceptable. I think
we should be particularly careful to safeguard the freedoms and
rights of children and prisoners. When society finds itself in the role
of parens patriae, we should bend over backward to see that our
decisions "for their own good" really are not serving our own inter-
ests. The conquistadores, in order to serve the supposed good of the
pagan children in the regions they conquered, performed psychosur-
gery with a vengeance. They bapitzed the children, then slammed
their heads against the rocks. It was for their own good that they
were spared the trauma of life in this tragic world.
The Kaimowitz case is similar to one in Colorado where a man
convicted of many cases of rape was given the opportunity of sus-
pended sentence if he would submit to castration." Two elements
are present in these cases. The first is the protection of the society.
The second is the good of the person himself. The argument being
made is that these particular crimes of passion and violence are
initiated by physico-chemical processes-"behind every twisted
thought there is a twisted molecule." 3 The instigating process can
be localized in the limbic system, perhaps in the amygdala. The
patient loses control and cannot be held responsible for his actions.
We intervene for his own good and our protection.
We need to be careful in forming policy in this field. Let me
conclude this first point by mentioning four safeguards that should
always be present in order to contour the proclivity to experimental
innovation and the right of persons to participate in such.
22. Johnson, Sex Offender's Emasculation Stirs Controversy, NATIONAL OBSERVER, Sept.
2, 1972, at 11.
23. A. ROSENFELD, THE SECOND GENESIS: THE COMING CONTROL OF LIFE (1969).
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First, the mind should evoke an awesome protecting response
from us. John Lilly closed down his labs and his work with dolphins
because he felt he could no longer "run a concentration camp for
advanced beings." 4 Although this may be taking the sense of tran-
scendence a little too far, the attitude of awe and wonder is com-
mendable. "It is only when one has learned to contemplate (be-
trachten) nature," said Kepler, "that one can come to understand
and respectfully use nature." 5
Secondly, as a general rule we should see diminished sensitivity
as undesirable, even if it does create greater social ease. We have
rejected lobotomies precisely because of their permanent and irre-
medial blunting and dulling effect. Peter Breggin has kept before us
the fact that all psychosurgery is "emotionally blunting." It may
render one contented and "cow-like," but have we sacrificed man's
genius and power and perhaps violated his very identity in the pro-
cess? We always seek the easy solution; drugs and surgery are easier
than the responsible reconstruction of the environment. If children
with heightened sensitivity and activity and boring schools do not
mix we tranquilize the kids.
Thirdly, the rights of privacy, self-determination, informed con-
sent, and the consent of the governed are bed-rock values that
should be overridden only by very compelling social reasons. Hope-
fully, a post-Watergate generation will never again justify suspen-
sion of the democratic system for what some man feels to be na-
tional security interests. We need to reconstitute the advocate, om-
budsman role in our society; and it is very unlikely that the legal
profession has the credibility to fulfill this role. "Public interests"
such as diminished aggression, "conquering the mind," or sparing
the patient the cruel and unusual punishment of having to make a
decision should always be scrutinized in terms of the values of per-
sonal freedom and responsibility.
As a final protecting guideline I would suggest that human re-
sponses such as anxiety, guilt, aggression, fear, love, obsessive be-
havior, etc., though often troubling and disruptive, should be re-
spected in their basic ambivalence. These are multifactorial powers
involving mind and environment. They are at once the genius and
the danger inherent in man's being. They should not be manipu-
lated except for absolutely compelling reasons.
24. M. PINES, THE BRAIN CHANGERS: SCIENTISTS AND THE NEW MIND CONTROL 17 (1974).
25. J. KEPLER, THE WISDOM
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This leads to the final point regarding the estimate of human
nature that will be needed to transit us successfully through an age
where wisdom is going to lag behind our knowledge and our technol-
ogy.
Paul Weiss has reminded us that the ninth amendment guaran-
tees to individuals all rights which are not explicitly given to the
federal government. It is not said what those rights are. Henry
Beecher is now talking of the right to be left alone. Others speak to
the right of not being left alone. In any case Weiss is correct when
he says: "We must ask, what is man? Our answer will tell us what
his rights are. '26
The classic question of who is man and whether he is a beast or
an angel is again invoked. Rene Dubos explicitly uses the motif,
arguing that the creative genius of man is his ability to both accept
and transcend his animality. He must recognize and exult in the
fact that he is "So Human an Animal. '2 7
Is man only an animal, as anthropologists and ethnologists from
Lorenz to Desmond Morris to Aubrey have suggested? Are the es-
sential elements of aggression, territoriality, and violence endemic
to man, that is, natural to him as an animal? Or are they contradic-
tions, flaws, or distortions which he brings to his nature, for which
he is responsible, and criminally liable? Are they diseases which
should be modulated into silent stupor, or cut or burned out through
invasive brain surgery?
On this argument, Edward Shils is our Peter Breggin and B. F.
Skinner our 0. J. Andy. Shils, arguing from the repulsion we feel
at invasive brain control and deliberate modification, says that we
cannot accept personality manipulation because it contravenes "the
affirmation that life is sacred. 28 By accepting these procedures, we
reduce man to an animal; and the question may be asked: "Why
should man's life be regarded with any more reverence than we
regard the lives of wild and domestic animals which we hunt and
eat, or pets which we breed and cherish? ' 29
Alternatively, B. F. Skinner and the host of behaviorists now at
work in hospitals, schools, the media and just about everywhere,
26. HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 6 (Spec. Supp. 1973).
27. R. DuBos, So HUMAN AN ANIMAL (1968).
28. Quoted in Burt, Why We Should Keep Prisoners from the Doctor: Reflections on
Psychosurgery in the Detroit Case, 5 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 22, 31 (1975).
29. Id.
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value man in a Pavlovian manner, stressing his vulnerability to
behavioral conditioning and rendering normative the skills of stimu-
lus response and interactivity. Skinner has said:
Animal, is a pejorative term, but only because "man" has
been made spuriously honorific. Some people have argued that
whereas the traditional view supports Hamlet's exclamation,
"How like a god!" Pavlov, the behavioral scientist, empha-
sized, "How like a dog!" But that was a step forward. A God
is the archetypal pattern of an explanatory fiction, of a miracle-
working mind, of the metaphysical. Man is much more than a
dog, but like a dog he is within range of scientific analysis.""0
Jose Delgado argues, in the spirit of Skinner, that man should
welcome his animality, should be proud that he has at long last
gotten over the inhibition to probe the human brain and is willing
now to draw even this majestic organ within the "experimental
reach." Now that this is true, we should deliberately set out not only
to correct mental distortions through psychosurgery and ESB, but
should begin to work more profound transformations on our brains
to enlarge and enhance our intellectual and affectual capacity.
These arguments recall the classic ideas of C. S. Lewis in his
study on The Problem of Pain.' Although the animals deserve pain
neither as punishment nor as purification, they participate in the
cosmic agony of growth and disease, brokenness and healing, well-
being and death. For this reason we abhor cruelty to animals, such
as the willful starvation of horses now in the fields of Texas. We put
the dog and the horse to sleep rather than protracting her suffering.
But man's suffering is to be endured, for it is purposive. Though like
the animals his life comes from the earth and will return to the
earth, he yearns to be set free. He knows he will die. The enigma of
death and the prefiguration of mortality in pain signals to him the
meaning and destiny of his life.
Man therefore should be esteemed as the transcending creature
in our public philosophy, our law, our medicine. That which sus-
tains his basic humanity from deliterious effect is acceptable ther-
apy. Secondary effects should be carefully pondered, however, espe-
cially when proxy decisions are required.
This need for a transcending reference for our ethical decisions is
the theme of a new play of Broadway called Equus.32 "What do
30. Id. at 22.
31. C. LEWIS, THE PROBLEM OF PAIN (1947).
32. P. SHAFFER, EQUUS & SHRIVINGS (Atheneum ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as EQuus].
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you do when the old gods have died and the new have not ap-
peared?" asks Morris Kaplan, reviewing the play in a recent issue
of The Hastings Center Report.3 3 A psychotic young man of 17, in a
fit of rage, has blinded not one but six horses with a sharp iron spike.
He is sent by the law to Martin Dysart, a psychiatrist in a provincial
British hospital. The play, which invokes some of the profound
themes of Greek drama, concentrates principally on what goes on
in the mind of the doctor. It explores the illuminating agony that
graces physicians who dare to cure themselves, while they carve,
however mercifully, into the pain of others.
The young patient is possessed by a rich though fantastic world
of primitive images. He dreams of an all-seeing Christ-chained,
scourged, beaten, and driven like a horse toward calvary. He is
obsessed with horses. These distorted symbols remind the psychia-
trist of the poverty of his own symbolic world and the need to tran-
scent the weak visions and values that proceed from secular ration-
ality.
"Oh the primitive world," I say. "What instinctual truths were
lost with it." And while I sit there, baiting a poor unimagina-
tive woman (Dysart's wife) with the word, that freaky boy tries
to conjure the reality. I sit looking at pages of centaurs tram-
pling the soil of Argos-and outside my window he is trying to
become one in a Hampsire field.34
Yet this nostalgia for a pagan mythology will not suffice, no mat-
ter how passionately Dr. Dysart and our world, caught up in Prome-
thean tasks, desire it. Our sense of transcendent obligation and the
bewildering demand for decisions should awaken us to the very
simple insight that we discover in the at once terrifying and awe-
some transcendent in human interaction. The ethical obligation of
that transcending perception is simply human responsibility; hon-
esty, justice, fairness, concern. In the face-to-face, person-to-person
responsiveness we discover what is the right, the good. This is the
deep philosophical meaning of informed consent, of therapy, of
healing. I conclude with the words of Dr. Dysart.
The normal is the good smile in a child's eyes-all right. It is
also the dead stare in a million adults. It both sustains and
kills-like a God. It is the Ordinary made beautiful; it is also
the average made lethal. The Normal is the indispensable,
murderous God of Health, and I am his Priest. My tools are
33. Kaplan, "Equus"-A Psychiatrist Questions His Priestly Powers, 5 HASTINGS CENTER
REPORT 9 (1975).
34. EQuus at 31.
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very delicate. My compassion is honest. I have honestly as-
sisted children in this room.
I have talked away terrors and relieved many agonies. But
also-beyond question-I have cut from them parts of individ-
uality repugnant to the God in both his aspects. Parts sacred
to rarer and more wonderful gods.35
To live with this excruciating uncertainty, yet to act with courage,
sensitivity, responsibility, guilt, forgiveness-this is becoming ma-
ture.
35. Id. at 63-64.
